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Abstract
Memory-safety violations are a prevalent cause of both
reliability and security vulnerabilities in systems software
written in unsafe languages like C/C++. Unfortunately,
all the existing software-based solutions to this problem
exhibit high performance overheads preventing them from
wide adoption in production runs. To address this issue,
Intel recently released a new ISA extension—Memory
Protection Extensions (Intel MPX), a hardware-assisted
full-stack solution to protect against memory safety viola-
tions.
In this work, we perform an exhaustive study of the
Intel MPX architecture to understand its advantages and
caveats. We base our study along three dimensions: (a)
performance overheads, (b) security guarantees, and (c)
usability issues. To put our results in perspective, we
compare Intel MPX with three prominent software-based
approaches: (1) trip-wire—AddressSanitizer, (2) object-
based—SAFECode, and (3) pointer-based—SoftBound.
Our main conclusion is that Intel MPX is a promising
technique that is not yet practical for widespread adoption.
Intel MPX’s performance overheads are still high (~50%
on average), and the supporting infrastructure has bugs
which may cause compilation or runtime errors. More-
over, we showcase the design limitations of Intel MPX:
it cannot detect temporal errors, may have false positives
and false negatives in multithreaded code, and its restric-
tions on memory layout require substantial code changes
for some programs.
This paper presents only the general discussion and aggregated
data; for the complete evaluation, please see the supporting website:
https://Intel-MPX.github.io/. Evaluation plots and section headings have
hyperlinks to the complete experimental description and results.
1 Introduction
The majority of systems software is written in low-level
languages such as C or C++. These languages allow com-
plete control over memory layout, which is especially
important for systems development. Unfortunately, the
ability to directly control memory often leads to viola-
tions of memory safety, i.e., illegal accesses to unintended
memory regions [50].
In particular, memory-safety violations emerge in the
form of spatial and temporal errors. Spatial errors—
also called buffer overflows and out-of-bounds accesses—
occur when a program reads from or writes to a different
memory region than the one expected by the developer.
Temporal errors—wild and dangling pointers—appear
when trying to use an object before it was created or after
it was deleted.
These memory-safety violations may result in sudden
crashes, data losses, and other nasty bugs [50]. Moreover,
these vulnerabilities can also be exploited to build a mem-
ory attack—a scenario when an adversary gets access to
an illegal region of memory and can hi-jack the system
or steal confidential data. This attack vector is prevailing
among low-level languages, with almost 1,200 memory
vulnerabilities published only in 2016 according to the
US National Vulnerability Database [40].
Given the importance of the problem, there are nu-
merous solutions for enforcing memory safety in unsafe
languages, ranging from static analysis to language ex-
tensions [8, 12, 13, 18, 24, 31, 32, 35, 38, 41, 42, 47, 55].
In this work, we concentrate on deterministic dynamic
bounds-checking since it is widely regarded as the only
way of defending against all memory attacks [37, 49].
Bounds-checking techniques augment the original un-
modified program with metadata (bounds of live objects
or allowed memory regions) and insert checks against
this metadata before each memory access. Whenever
a bounds check fails, the program is aborted and thus
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the attack is prevented. Unfortunately, state-of-the-art
bounds-checking techniques exhibit high performance
overhead (50–150%) which limits their usage to develop-
ment stages only.
To lower runtime overheads, Intel recently released
a new ISA extension—Memory Protection Extensions
(Intel MPX). Its underlying idea is to provide hardware
assistance, in the form of new instructions and registers,
to software-based bounds checking, making it more effi-
cient.
Yet, to our knowledge, there is no comprehensive evalu-
ation of Intel MPX, neither from the academic community
nor from Intel itself. Therefore, the goal of this work was
to analyze Intel MPX in three dimensions: performance,
security, and usability. Performance is important because
only solutions with low (up to 10–20%) runtime overhead
have a chance to be adopted in practice [49]. It was also
crucial to investigate the root causes of the overheads to
pave the way for future improvements. Security assess-
ment on a set of real-world vulnerabilities was required
to verify advertised security guarantees. Usability evalu-
ation gave us insights on Intel MPX production quality
and—more importantly—on application-specific issues
that arise under Intel MPX and need to be manually fixed.
To fully explore Intel MPX’s pros and cons, we put
the results into perspective by comparing with existing
software-based solutions. In particular, we compared Intel
MPX with three prominent techniques that showcase main
classes of memory safety: trip-wire Address Sanitizer
[47], object-based SAFECode [18], and pointer-based
SoftBound [38] (see §2 for details).
Our investigation reveals that Intel MPX has high po-
tential, but is not yet ready for widespread use. Some of
the lessons we learned are:
• New Intel MPX instructions are not as fast as ex-
pected and cause up to 4× slowdown in the worst
case, although compiler optimizations amortize it
and lead to runtime overheads of ~50% on average.
• The supporting infrastructure (compiler passes and
runtime libraries) is not mature enough and has bugs,
such that 3–10% programs cannot compile/run.
• In contrast to other solutions, Intel MPX provides
no protection against temporal errors.
• Intel MPX may have false positives and false nega-
tives in multithreaded code.
• By default, Intel MPX imposes restrictions on al-
lowed memory layout, such that 8–13% programs do
not run correctly without substantial code changes.
In addition, we had to apply (non-intrusive) manual
fixes to 18% programs.
Though the first three issues can be fixed in future ver-
sions, the last two can be considered fundamental design
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Figure 1: Designs of three memory-safety classes: trip-
wire (AddressSanitizer), object-based (SAFECode),
and pointer-based (SoftBound).
limits. We project that adding support for multithreading
would inevitably hamper performance, and relaxing re-
strictions on memory layout would go against Intel MPX
philosophy.
2 Background
All spatial and temporal bugs, as well as memory attacks
built on such vulnerabilities, are caused by an access
to a prohibited memory region. To prevent such bugs,
memory safety must be imposed on the program, i.e., the
following invariant must be enforced: memory accesses
must always stay within the originally intended (referent)
objects.
Memory safety can be achieved by various methods,
including pure static analysis [19, 55], hardware-based
checking [32, 36, 51, 54], probabilistic methods [13, 33,
43], and extensions of the C/C++ languages [30, 35, 41].
In this work, we concentrate on deterministic runtime
bounds-checking techniques that transparently instrument
legacy programs (Intel MPX is but one of them). These
techniques provide the highest security guarantees while
requiring little to no manual effort to adapt the program.
For a broader discussion, please refer to [49].
Existing runtime techniques can be broadly classified
as trip-wire, object-based, and pointer-based [37]. In a
nutshell, all three classes create, track, and check against
some bounds metadata kept alongside original data of the
program. Trip-wire approaches create “shadow mem-
ory” metadata for the whole available program mem-
ory, pointer-based approaches create bounds metadata per
each pointer, and object-based approaches create bounds
metadata per each object.
For comparison with Intel MPX, we chose a promi-
nent example from each of the aforementioned classes:
AddressSanitizer, SAFECode, and SoftBound. Figure 1
highlights the differences between them.
Trip-wire approach: AddressSanitizer [47]. This class
surrounds all objects with regions of marked (poisoned)
memory called redzones, so that any overflow will change
2
values in this—otherwise invariable—region and will be
consequently detected. In particular, AddressSanitizer
reserves 1/8 of all virtual memory for the shadow memory
which is accessed only by the instrumentation and not
the original program. AddressSanitizer updates data in
shadow memory whenever a new object is created and
freed, and inserts checks on shadow memory before mem-
ory accesses to objects. The check itself looks like this:
shadowAddr = MemToShadow(ptr)
if (ShadowIsPoisoned(shadowAddr))
ReportError()
In addition, AddressSanitizer provides means to detect
temporal errors via a quarantine zone: if a memory region
has been freed, it is kept in the quarantine for some time
before it becomes allowed for reuse.
AddressSanitizer was built for debugging purposes and
is not targeted for security (though it could be used in
this context [15, 37, 52]). For example, it may not detect
non-contiguous out-of-bounds violations. Nevertheless,
it detects many spatial bugs and significantly raises the
bar for the attacker. It is also the most widely-used tech-
nique in its class, comparing favorably to other trip-wire
techniques such as Light-weight Bounds Checking [24],
Purify [25], and Valgrind [42].
Object-based approach: SAFECode [17, 18]. This
class’s main idea is enforcing the intended referent, i.e.,
making sure that pointer manipulations do not change
the pointer’s referent object. In SAFECode, this rule is
relaxed: each object is allocated in one of several fine-
grained partitions—pools—determined at compile-time
using pointer analysis; the pointer must always land into
the predefined pool. This technique allows powerful op-
timizations and simple runtime checks against the pool
bounds:
poolAddr = MaskLowBits(ptr)
if (poolAddr not in predefinedPoolAddrs)
ReportError()
On the downside, SAFECode provides worse guarantees
than AddressSanitizer—buffer overflow to an object in
the same pool will go undetected.
We also inspected and discarded other object-based
approaches. CRED [46] has huge performance overheads,
mudflap [20] is deprecated in newer versions of GCC, and
Baggy Bounds Checking [12] is not open sourced.
Pointer-based approach: SoftBound [38, 39]. Such
approaches keep track of pointer bounds (the lowest and
the highest address the pointer is allowed to access) and
check each memory write and read against them. Note
how SoftBound associates metadata not with an object
but rather with a pointer to the object. This allows pointer-
based techniques to detect intra-object overflows (one
field overflowing into another field of the same struct) by
narrowing bounds associated with the particular pointer.
Intel MPX closely resembles SoftBound; indeed, a
hardware-assisted enhancement of SoftBound called
WatchdogLite shares many similarities with Intel MPX
[36]. For our comparison, we used the SoftBound+CETS
version which keeps pointer metadata in a two-level trie—
similar to MPX’s bounds tables—and introduces a scheme
to protect against temporal errors [39]. The checks in this
version are as follows:
LoBound,UpBound,key,lock = TrieLookup(ptr)
if (ptr < LoBound or ptr > UpBound or key != ∗lock)
ReportError()
As for other pointer-based approaches, MemSafe [48]
is not open sourced, and CCured [41] and Cyclone [30]
require manual changes in programs.
3 Intel Memory Protection Extensions
Intel Memory Protection Extensions (Intel MPX) was
first announced in 2013 [28] and introduced as part of
the Skylake microarchitecture in late 2015 [27]. The
sole purpose of Intel MPX is to transparently add bounds
checking to legacy C/C++ programs. Consider a code
snippet in Figure 2a. The original program allocates an
array a[10] with 10 pointers to some buffer objects of
type obj (Line 1). Next, it iterates through the first M
items of the array to calculate the sum of objects’ length
values (Lines 3–8). In C, this loop would look like this:
for (i=0; i<M; i++) total += a[i]−>len;
Since M is a variable, a bug or a malicious activity may set
M to a value that is larger than obj size and an overflow
will happen. Also, note how the array item access a[i]
decays into a pointer ai on Line 4, and how the subfield
access decays to lenptr on Line 6.
Figure 2b shows the resulting code with Intel MPX
protection applied. First, the bounds for the array a[10]
are created on Line 3 (the array contains 10 pointers each
8 bytes wide, hence the upper-bound offset of 79). Then in
the loop, before the array item access on Line 8, two MPX
bounds checks are inserted to detect if a[i] overflows
(Lines 6–7). Note that since the protected load reads an 8-
byte pointer from memory, it is important to check ai+7
against the upper bound (Line 7).
Now that the pointer to the object is loaded in objptr,
the program wants to load the obj.len subfield. By de-
sign, Intel MPX must protect this second load by check-
ing the bounds of the objptr pointer. Where does it get
these bounds from? In Intel MPX, every pointer stored in
memory has its associated bounds also stored in a special
memory region accessed via bndstx and bndldx MPX
instructions (see next subsection for details). Thus, when
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(a) Original code
struct obj { char buf[100]; int len }
1 obj∗ a[10] ;; Array of pointers to objs
2 total = 0
3 for (i=0; i<M; i++): ;; M may be greater than 10
4 ai = a + i ;; Pointer arithmetic on a
5 objptr = load ai ;; Pointer to obj at a[i]
6 lenptr = objptr + 100 ;; Pointer to obj.len
7 len = load lenptr
8 total += len ;; Total length of all objs
(b) Intel MPX
1 obj∗ a[10]
2 total = 0
3 a_b = bndmk a, a+79 ;; Make bounds [a, a+79]
4 for (i=0; i<M; i++):
5 ai = a + i
6 bndcl a_b, ai ;; Lower-bound check of a[i]
7 bndcu a_b, ai+7 ;; Upper-bound check of a[i]
8 objptr = load ai
9 objptr_b = bndldx ai ;; Bounds for pointer at a[i]
10 lenptr = objptr + 100
11 bndcl objptr_b, lenptr ;; Checks of obj.len e
12 bndcu objptr_b, lenptr+3 c
13 len = load lenptr
14 total += len
Figure 2: Example of bounds checking using Intel
MPX.
the objptr pointer is retrieved from memory address
ai, its corresponding bounds are retrieved using bndldx
from the same address (Line 9). Finally, the two bounds
checks are inserted before the load of the length value on
Lines 11–121.
Intel MPX requires modifications at each level of the
hardware-software stack2:
• At the hardware level, new instructions as well as
a set of 128-bit registers are added. Also, a bounds
violation exception (#BR) thrown by these new in-
structions is introduced.
• At the OS level, a new #BR exception handler is
added that has two main functions: (1) allocating
storage for bounds on-demand and (2) sending a
signal to the program whenever a bounds violation
is detected.
• At the compiler level, new Intel MPX transformation
passes are added to insert MPX instructions to cre-
ate, propagate, store, and check bounds. Additional
runtime libraries provide initialization/finalization
routines, statistics and debug info, and wrappers for
functions from C standard library.
• At the application level, the MPX-protected program
may require manual changes due to unconventional
C coding patterns, multithreading issues, or potential
problems with other ISA extensions. (In some cases,
1Note that narrowing of bounds is not shown for simplicity, see §3.3.
2Henceforth, we focus on 64-bit Linux-based support of Intel MPX.
it is inadvisable to use Intel MPX at all.)
In the following, we detail how Intel MPX support is
implemented at each level of the hardware-software stack.
3.1 Hardware
At its core, Intel MPX provides 7 new instructions and a
set of 128-bit bounds registers. The current Intel Skylake
architecture provides four registers named bnd0–bnd3.
Each of them stores a lower 64-bit bound in bits 0–63 and
an upper 64-bit bound in bits 64–127.
Instruction set. The new MPX instructions are: bndmk
to create new bounds, bndcl and bndcu/bndcn to com-
pare the pointer value against the lower and upper bounds
in bnd respectively, bndmov to move bounds from one
bnd register to another and to spill them to stack, and
bndldx and bndstx to load and store pointer bounds in
special Bounds Tables respectively. Note that bndcu has
a one’s complement version bndcn which has exactly the
same characteristics, thus we mention only bndcu in the
following. The example in Figure 2b shows how most of
these instructions are used. The instruction not shown is
bndmov which serves mainly for internal rearrangements
in registers and on stack.
Intel MPX additionally changes the x86-64 calling
convention. In a nutshell, the bounds for corresponding
pointer arguments are put in registers bnd0–bnd3 before
a function call and the bounds for the pointer return value
are put in bnd0 before return from the function.
It is interesting to compare the benefits of hardware
implementation of bounds-checking against the software-
only counterpart—SoftBound in our case [38, 39]. First,
Intel MPX introduces separate bounds registers to lower
register pressure on the general-purpose register (GPR)
file, something that software-only approaches suffer from.
Second, software-based approaches cannot modify the
calling convention and resort to function cloning, when a
set of function arguments is extended to include pointer
bounds. This leads to more cumbersome caller/callee
code and problems with interoperability with legacy unin-
strumented libraries. Finally, dedicated bndcl and bndcu
instructions substitute the software-based “compare and
branch” instruction sequence, saving one cycle and exert-
ing no pressure on branch predictor.
The prominent feature of Intel MPX is its backwards-
compatibility and interoperability with legacy code. On
the one hand, MPX-instrumented code can run on legacy
hardware because Intel MPX instructions are interpreted
as NOPs on older architectures. This is done to ease
the distribution of binaries—the same MPX-enabled pro-
gram/library can be distributed to all clients. On the other
hand, Intel MPX has a comprehensive support to interop-
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Figure 3: Loading of pointer bounds using two-level
address translation.
erate with unmodified legacy code: (1) a BNDPRESERVE
configuration bit allows to pass pointers without bounds
information created by legacy code, and (2) when legacy
code changes a pointer in memory, the later bndldx of
this pointer notices the change and assigns always-true
(INIT) bounds to it. In both cases, the pointer creat-
ed/altered in legacy code is considered “boundless”: this
allows for interoperability but also creates holes in Intel
MPX defense3 [1].
Storing bounds in memory. The current version of In-
tel MPX has only 4 bounds registers, which is clearly
not enough for real-world programs—we will run out of
registers even if we have only 5 distinct pointers. Accord-
ingly, all additional bounds have to be stored (spilled) in
memory, similar to spilling data out of general-purpose
registers. A simple and relatively fast option is to copy
them directly into a compiler-defined memory location
(on stack) with bndmov. However, it works only inside
a single stack frame: if a pointer is later reused in an-
other function, its bounds will be lost. To solve this issue,
two instructions were introduced—bndstx and bndldx.
They store/load bounds to/from a memory location de-
rived from the address of the pointer itself (see Figure 2b,
Line 9), thus making it easy to find pointer bounds with-
out any additional information, though at a price of higher
complexity.
When bndstx and bndldx are used, bounds are stored
in a memory location calculated with two-level address
translation scheme, similar to virtual address translation
(paging). In particular, each pointer has an entry in a
Bounds Table (BT), which is allocated dynamically and
3x264 from PARSEC highlights this issue: its x264_malloc func-
tion internally calls memalign which has no corresponding wrapper.
Thus, the pointer returned by this function is “boundless”. Since all
dynamic objects are created through this function, the whole program
operates on “boundless” pointers, rendering Intel MPX protection utterly
useless.
Bounds Directory
Bounds Table
②  load BDE
③  if BDE is empty: 
raise #BR
 ④  allocate BT
①  store bounds
 ⑤  store new BDE
⑥
 re-execute 
store
⑦
 continue
OS
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Application
Figure 4: The procedure of Bounds Table creation.
is comparable to a page table. Addresses of BTs are
stored in a Bounds Directory (BD), which corresponds to
a page directory in our analogy. For a specific pointer, its
entries in the BD and the BT are derived from the memory
address in which the pointer is stored.
Note that our comparison to paging is only conceptual;
the implementation side differs significantly. Firstly, the
MMU is not involved in the translation and all operations
are performed by the CPU itself. Secondly and most
importantly, Intel MPX does not have a dedicated cache
(such as a TLB cache), thus it has to share normal caches
with application data. In some cases, it may lead to severe
performance degradation caused by cache thrashing.
The address translation is a multistage process. Con-
sider loading of pointer bounds (Figure 3). In the first
stage, the corresponding BD entry has to be loaded. For
that, the CPU: 1© extracts the offset of BD entry from bits
20–47 of the pointer address and shifts it by 3 bits (since
all BD entries are 23 bits long), 2© loads the base address
of BD from the BNDCFGx4 register, and 3© sums the base
and the offset and loads the BD entry from the resulting
address.
In the second stage, the CPU: 4© extracts the offset
of BT entry from bits 3–19 of the pointer address and
shifts it by 5 bits (since all BT entries are 25 bits long), 5©
shifts the loaded entry—which corresponds to the base of
BT—by 3 to remove the metadata contained in the first
3 bits, and 6© sums the base and the offset and 7© finally
loads the BT entry from the resulting address. Note that a
BT entry has an additional “pointer” field—if the actual
pointer value and the value in this field mismatch, Intel
MPX will mark the bounds as always-true (INIT). This
is required for interoperability with legacy code and only
happens when this code modifies the pointer.
This operation is expensive—it requires approximately
3 register-to-register moves, 3 shifts, and 2 memory loads.
On top of it, since these 2 loads are non-contiguous, the
protected application has worse cache locality.
Interaction with other ISA extensions. Intel MPX can
cause issues when used together with other ISA exten-
sions, e.g., Intel TSX and Intel SGX. Intel MPX may
cause transactional aborts in some corner cases when
4In particular, BNDCFGU in user space and BNDCFGS in kernel mode.
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Instruction Description Lat Tput
bndmk b,m create pointer bounds 1 2
bndcl b,m check mem-operand addr against lower 1 1
bndcl b,r check reg-operand addr against lower 1 2
bndcu b,m check mem-operand addr against upper 1 1
bndcu b,r check reg-operand addr against upper 1 2
bndmov b,m move pointer bounds from mem 1 1
bndmov b,b move pointer bounds to other reg 1 2
bndmov m,b move pointer bounds to mem 2 0.5
bndldx b,m load pointer bounds from BT 4-6 0.4
bndstx m,b store pointer bounds in BT 4-6 0.3
Note: bndcu has a one’s complement version bndcn, we skip it for clarity
Table 1: Latency (cycles/instr) and Tput (instr/cycle)
of Intel MPX instructions; b—MPX bounds regis-
ter; m—memory operand; r—general-purpose register
operand.
used inside an Intel TSX hardware transaction (see [29]
for the details). Also, since Bounds Tables and #BR ex-
ceptions are managed by the OS, Intel MPX cannot be
used as-is in an Intel SGX enclave environment. Indeed,
the malicious OS could tamper with these structures and
subvert correct MPX execution. To prevent such scenar-
ios, Intel MPX allows to move this functionality into the
SGX enclave and verify every OS action [31]. Finally,
we are not aware of any side-channel attacks that could
utilize Intel MPX inside the enclave.
Microbenchmark. As a first step in our evaluation, we
analyzed latency and throughput of MPX instructions.
For this, we extended the scripts used to build Agner
Fog’s instruction tables—a de-facto standard for evalu-
ating CPU instructions [23]. For each run, we initialize
all bnd registers with dummy values to avoid interrupts
caused by failed bound checks.
Table 1 shows the latency-throughput results, and Fig-
ure 5 depicts which execution ports can MPX instructions
use. As expected, most operations have latencies of one
cycle, e.g., the most frequently used bndcl and bndcu
instructions. The serious bottleneck is storing/loading
the bounds with bndstx and bndldx since they undergo
a complex algorithm of accessing bounds tables, as ex-
plained in the previous section.
In our experiments, we observed that Intel MPX pro-
tection does not increase the IPC (instructions/cycle) of
programs, which is usually the case for memory-safety
techniques (see Figure 11). This was surprising: we ex-
pected that Intel MPX would take advantage of underuti-
lized CPU resources for programs with low original IPC.
To understand what causes this bottleneck, we measured
the throughput of typical MPX check sequences.5
5We originally blamed an unjustified data dependency between
bndcl/u and the protected memory access (which proved wrong).
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Figure 5: Distribution of Intel MPX instructions among
execution ports (Intel Skylake).
Our measurements pointed to a bottleneck of
“bndcl/u b,m” instructions due to contention on port 1.
Without checks (Figure 6 a), our original benchmark
could execute two loads in parallel, achieving a through-
put of 2 IPC (note that the loaded data is always in a Mem-
ory Ordering Buffer). After adding “bndcl/u b,r” checks
(Figure 6 b), IPC increased to three instructions per cy-
cle (3 IPC): one load, one lower-, and one upper-bound
check per cycle. For “bndcl/u b,m” checks (Figure 6 c),
however, IPC became less than original: two loads and
four checks were scheduled in four cycles, thus IPC of
1.5. In summary, the final IPC was ~1.5–3 (compare to
original IPC of 2), proving that the MPX-protected pro-
gram typically has approximately the same IPC as the
original.
As Figures 9 and 10 show, it causes major performance
degradation. It can be fixed, however; if the next genera-
tions of CPUs will provide the relative memory address
calculation on other ports, the checks could be paral-
lelized and performance will improve. We speculate that
GCC-MPX could perform on par with AddressSanitizer
in this case, because the instruction overheads are similar.
Accordingly, ICC version would be even better and the
slowdowns might drop lower than 20%. But we must note
that we do not have any hard proof for this speculation.
3.2 Operating System
The operating system has two main responsibilities in
the context of Intel MPX: it handles bounds violations
and manages BTs, i.e., creates and deletes them. Both
these actions are hooked to a new class of exceptions,
#BR, which has been introduced solely for Intel MPX
and is similar to a page fault, although with extended
functionality.
Bounds exception handling. If an MPX-enabled CPU
detects a bounds violation, i.e., if a referenced pointer
appears to be outside of the checked bounds, #BR is raised
and the processor traps into the kernel (in case of Linux).
The kernel decodes the instruction to get the violating
address and the violated bounds, and stores them in the
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Figure 6: Bottleneck of bounds checking illustrated: since relative memory addresses can be calculated only by port
1, a contention appears and bounds checks are executed sequentially.
siginfo structure. Afterwards, it delivers the SIGSEGV
signal to the application together with information about
the violation in siginfo. At this point the application
developer has a choice: she can either provide an ad-hoc
signal handler to recover or choose one of the default
policies: crash, print an error and continue, or silently
ignore it.
Bounds tables management. Two levels of bounds ad-
dress translation are managed differently: BD is allocated
only once by a runtime library (at application startup) and
BTs have to be created dynamically on-demand. The later
is a task of OS. The procedure is presented in Figure 4.
Each time an application tries to store pointer bounds 1©,
the CPU loads the corresponding entry from the BD and
checks if it is a valid entry 2©. If the check fails, the
CPU raises #BR and traps into the kernel 3©. The kernel
allocates a new BT 4©, stores its address in the BD entry
5© and returns in the user space 6©. Then, the CPU stores
bounds in the newly created BT and continues executing
the application in the normal mode of operation 7©.
Since the application is oblivious of BT allocation, the
OS also has to free these tables. In Linux, this “garbage
collection” is performed whenever a memory object is
freed or, more precisely, unmapped. OS goes through the
elements of the object and removes all the correspond-
ing BT entries. If one of the tables becomes completely
unused, OS will free the BT and remove its entry in the
BD.
Microbenchmark. To illustrate the additional overhead
of allocating and de-allocating BTs, we manufactured two
microbenchmarks that showcase the worst case scenar-
ios. The first one stores a large set of pointers in such
memory locations that each of them will have a separate
BT, i.e., this benchmark indirectly creates a large number
of bounds tables. The second one does the same, but in
addition, it frees all the memory right after it has been
assigned, thus triggering BT de-allocation. Our measure-
ment results are shown in Table 2 (note that we disabled
all compiler optimizations to showcase the influence of
OS alone). In both cases, most of the runtime parameters
(cache locality, branch misses, etc.) of the MPX-protected
version are equivalent to the native one. However, the
Increase in # of instructions (%)
Type Slowdown User space Kernel space
allocation 2.33× 7.5 160
+ de-allocation 2.25× 10 139
Table 2: Worst-case OS impact on performance of
MPX.
slowdown is noticeable—more than 2 times. It is caused
by a single parameter that varies—the number of instruc-
tions executed in the kernel space. It means that the
overhead is caused purely by the BT management in the
kernel. From this, we can conclude that OS itself can
make an MPX-protected application up to 2.3× slower,
although this scenario is quite rare.
In this section, we discussed only Linux implemen-
tation. However, all the same mechanisms can also be
found in Windows. The only significant difference is that
Intel MPX support on Windows is done by a daemon,
while on Linux the functionality is implemented in the
kernel itself [7].
3.3 Compiler and Runtime Library
Hardware Intel MPX support in the form of new instruc-
tions and registers significantly lowers performance over-
head of each separate bounds-checking operation. How-
ever, the main burden of efficient, correct, and complete
bounds checking of whole programs lies on the compiler
and its associated runtime.
Compiler support. As of the date of this writing, only
GCC 5.0+ and ICC 15.0+ compilers have support for Intel
MPX [7, 21]. To enable Intel MPX protection of appli-
cations, both GCC and ICC introduce the new compiler
pass called Pointer(s) Checker. Enabling Intel MPX is
intentionally as simple as adding a couple of flags to the
usual compilation process:
>> gcc −fcheck−pointer−bounds −mmpx test.c
>> icc −check−pointers−mpx=rw test.c
In a glance, the Pointer Checker pass instruments the
original program as follows. (1) It allocates static bounds
for global variables and inserts bndmk instructions for
stack-allocated ones. (2) It inserts bndcl and bndcu
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bounds-check instructions before each load or store from
a pointer. (3) It moves bounds from one bnd register to
another using bndmov whenever a new pointer is created
from an old one. (4) It spills least used bounds to stack
via bndmov if running out of available bnd registers. (5)
It loads and stores the associated bounds via bndldx and
bndstx respectively whenever a pointer is loaded/stored
from/to memory.
One of the advantages of Intel MPX—in comparison
to AddressSanitizer and SAFECode—is that it supports
narrowing of struct bounds by design. Consider struct
obj from Figure 2. It contains two fields: a 100B buffer
buf and an integer len right after it. It is easy to see
that an off-by-one overflow in obj.buf will spillover
and corrupt the adjacent obj.len. AddressSanitizer and
SAFECode by design cannot detect such intra-object over-
flows (though AddressSanitizer can be used to detect a
subset of such errors [44]). In contrast, Intel MPX can be
instructed to narrow bounds when code accesses a specific
field of a struct, e.g., on Line 10 in Figure 2b. Here, in-
stead of checking against the bounds of the full object, the
compiler would shrink objptr_b to only four bytes and
compare against these narrowed bounds on Lines 11–12.
Narrowing of bounds may require (sometimes intrusive)
changes in the source code, and is enabled by default.
By default, the MPX pass instruments both memory
writes and reads: this ensures protection from buffer over-
writes and buffer overreads. The user can instruct the
MPX pass to instrument only writes. The motivation is
twofold. First, instrumenting only writes significantly
reduces performance overhead of Intel MPX (from 2.5×
to 1.3× for GCC). Second, the most dangerous bugs are
those that overwrite memory (classic overflows to gain
privileged access to the remote machine), and the only-
writes protection can already provide sufficiently high
security guarantees.
At least in GCC implementation, the pass can be fine-
tuned via additional compilation flags. In our experience,
these flags provide no additional benefit in terms of perfor-
mance, security, or usability. For a full list of supported
flags, refer to the official documentation of Intel MPX
[7].
For performance, compilers must try their best to opti-
mize away redundant MPX code. There are two common
optimizations used by GCC and ICC (also used, for exam-
ple, in Baggy Bounds [12]). (1) Removing bounds-checks
when the compiler can statically prove safety of memory
access, e.g., access inside an array with a known offset.
(2) Moving (hoisting) bounds-checks out of simple loops.
Consider Figure 2b. If it is known that M<=10, then opti-
mization (1) can remove always-true checks on Lines 6–7.
Otherwise, optimization (2) can kick in and move these
checks before the loop body, saving two instructions on
Compiler & runtime issues GCC ICC
– Poor MPX pass optimizations * 22/38 3/38
– Bugs in MPX compiler pass:
– incorrect bounds during function calls – 2/38
– conflicts with auto-vectorization passes – 3/38
– corrupted stack due to C99 VLA arrays – 3/38
– unknown internal compiler error 1/38 –
– Bugs and issues in runtime libraries:
– Missing wrappers for libc functions all all
– Nullified bounds in memcpy wrapper all –
– Performance bug in memcpy wrapper – all
*One compiler has > 10% worse results than the other
Table 3: Issues in the compiler pass and runtime li-
braries of Intel MPX. Columns 2 and 3 show number
of affected programs (out of total 38).6
each iteration.
Runtime library. As a final step of the MPX-enabled
build process, the application must be linked against two
MPX-specific libraries: libmpx and libmpxwrappers
(libchkp for ICC).
The libmpx library is responsible for MPX initializa-
tion at program startup: it enables hardware and OS sup-
port and configures MPX runtime options (passed through
environment variables). Most of these options concern
debugging and logging, but two of them define security
guarantees. First, CHKP_RT_MODE must be set to “stop” in
production use to stop the program immediately when a
bounds violation is detected; set it to “count” only for de-
bugging purposes. Second, CHKP_RT_BNDPRESERVE de-
fines whether application can call legacy, uninstrumented
functions in external libraries; it must be enabled if the
whole program is MPX-protected.
By default, libmpx registers a signal handler that either
halts execution or writes a debug message (depending
on runtime options). However, this default handler can
be overwritten by the user’s custom handler. This can
be useful if the program must shutdown gracefully or
checkpoint its state.
Another interesting feature is that the user can instruct
libmpx to disallow creation of BTs by the OS (see §3.2).
In this case, the #BR exception will be forwarded directly
to the program which can allocate BTs itself. One sce-
nario where this can come handy is when the user com-
pletely distrusts the OS, e.g., when using SGX enclaves
[31].
The libmpxwrappers library in GCC (and its ana-
logue libchkp in ICC) contain wrappers for functions
from C standard library (libc). Similar to AddressSani-
tizer, Intel MPX implementations do not instrument libc
and instead wrap all its functions with a bounds-checking
counterparts.
6All bugs were acknowledged by developers. Bug reports:
https://software.intel.com/en-us/forums/intel-c-compiler/topic/700550;
https://software.intel.com/en-us/forums/intel-c-compiler/topic/700675;
https://software.intel.com/en-us/forums/intel-c-compiler/topic/701764;
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Figure 7: Intel MPX overheads in 3 possible scenarios:
application is dominated by bounds-checking (array-
write and arrayread), by bounds creation and narrow-
ing (struct), and by bounds propagation (ptrcreation).
Issues. For both GCC and ICC, the compiler and runtime
support have a number of issues summarized in Table 3.
Concerning performance, current implementations of
GCC and ICC take different stances when it comes to
optimizing MPX code. GCC is conservative and prefers
stability of original programs over performance gains.
On many occasions, we noticed that the GCC MPX pass
disables other optimizations, e.g., loop unrolling and au-
tovectorization. It also hoists bounds-checks out of loops
less often than ICC does. ICC, on the other hand, is more
aggressive in its MPX-related optimizations and does not
prevent other aggressive optimizations from being applied.
Unfortunately, this intrusive behavior renders ICC’s pass
less stable: we detected three kinds of compiler bugs due
to incorrect optimizations.
We also observed issues with the runtime wrapper li-
braries. First, only a handful of most widely-used libc
functions are covered, e.g., malloc, memcpy, strlen,
etc. This leads to undetected bugs when other functions
are called, e.g., the bug with recv in §5.2. For use in
production, these libraries must be expanded to cover all
of libc. Second, while most wrappers follow a simple
pattern of “check bounds and call real function”, there
exist more complicated cases. For example, memcpy must
be implemented so that it copies not only the contents
of one memory area to another, but also all associated
pointer bounds in BTs. GCC library uses a fast algorithm
to achieve this, but ICC’s libchkp has a performance
bottleneck (see also §4).
Microbenchmarks. To understand the impact of differ-
ent compiler flags and optimizations, we wrote four mi-
crobenchmarks, each highlighting a separate MPX feature.
Two benchmarks—arraywrite and arrayread—perform
writes to/reads from memory and stress bndcl and bndcu
accordingly. The struct benchmark writes in an inner
array inside a struct and stresses the bounds-narrowing
feature via bndmk and bndmov. Finally, the ptrcreation
benchmark constantly assigns new values to pointers and
stresses bounds propagation via bndstx. Figure 7 shows
the performance overheads over native versions.
We can notice several interesting details. First, array-
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=78631
Application-level issues GCC ICC
– Flexible or variable-sized array (arr[1] /
arr[])
7/38 7/38
– Accessing struct through struct field * 1/38 3/38
– Custom memory management 2/38 2/38
* GCC affects less programs due to milder rules w.r.t. first field of struct
Table 4: Applications may violate memory-model as-
sumptions of Intel MPX. Columns 2 and 3 show num-
ber of misbehaving programs (out of total 38).
write and arrayread represent bare overhead of bounds-
checking instructions (all in registers), 50% in this case.
struct has a higher overhead of 2.1−2.8× due to the more
expensive making and moving of bounds to and from the
stack. The 5× overhead of ptrcreation is due to storing of
bounds—the most expensive MPX operation (see §3.1).
Such high overhead is alarming because pointer-intensive
applications require many loads and stores of bounds.
Second, there is a 25% difference between GCC and
ICC in arraywrite. This is the effect of optimizations:
GCC’s MPX pass blocks loop unrolling while ICC’s im-
plementation takes advantage of it. (Interestingly, the
same happened in case of arrayread but the native ICC
version was optimized even better, which led to a rela-
tively poor performance of ICC’s MPX.)
Third, the overhead of arrayread becomes negligible
with the only-writes MPX version: the only memory
accesses in this benchmark are reads which are left unin-
strumented. Finally, the same logic applies to struct—
disabling narrowing of bounds effectively removes expen-
sive bndmk and bndmov instructions and lowers perfor-
mance overhead to a bare minimum.
3.4 Application
At the application level, we observed two main issues
of Intel MPX. First, Intel MPX cannot support several
widely-used C programming idioms (some by design,
some due to implementation choices) and thus can break
programs. Second and more importantly, there is no sup-
port for multithreaded programs.
Not supported C idioms. As discussed previously, one
of the main features of Intel MPX—narrowing of bounds—
can increase security because the code that explicitly
works with one field of a complex object will not be able
corrupt other fields. Unfortunately, our evaluation reveals
that narrowing of bounds breaks many programs (see Ta-
ble 4). The general problem is that C/C++ programs fre-
quently deviate from the standard memory model [16, 34].
A common C idiom (before C99) is flexible array fields
with array size of one, e.g., arr[1]. In practice, ob-
jects with such array fields have a dynamic size of more
than one item, but there is no way of MPX knowing
this at compile-time. Thus, Intel MPX attempts to nar-
9
char∗ arr[1000] ;; Array with MPX data race
char obj1 ;; Two adjacent objects e
char obj2 c
1 while (true): ;; Background thread
2 for (i=0; i<1000; i++) arr[i] = &obj1
3 for (i=0; i<1000; i++) arr[i] = &obj2
4 while (true): ;; Main thread
5 for (i=0; i<1000; i++) ∗(arr[i] + offset)
Figure 8: This program breaks Intel MPX. If offset=0
then MPX has false alarms, else — undetected bugs.
row bounds to one-item size whenever arr is accessed,
which leads to false positives. A similar idiom is variable-
sized arrays also not supported by Intel MPX, e.g., arr[].
These idioms are frequently seen in modern programs,
see Table 4, row 1. Note that the C99-standard arr[0] is
acceptable and does not break programs.
Another common idiom is using a struct field (usually
the first field of struct) to access other fields of the struct.
Again, this breaks the assumptions of Intel MPX and
leads to runtime #BR exceptions (see Table 4, row 2).
GCC makes an exception for this case since it is such a
popular practice, but ICC is strict and does not have this
special rule.
Finally, some programs introduce “memory hacks”
for performance, ignoring restrictions of the C memory
model completely. The SPEC2006 suite has two such
examples: gcc has its own complicated memory manage-
ment with arbitrary type casts and in-pointer bit twiddling,
and soplex features a scheme that moves objects from one
memory region to another by adding an offset to each
affected pointer (Table 4, row 3). Both these cases lead to
false positives.
Ultimately, all such non-compliant cases must be fixed
(indeed, we patched flexible/variable-length array issues
to work under Intel MPX). However, sometimes the user
may have strong incentives against modifying the original
code. In this case, she can opt for slightly worse secu-
rity guarantees and disable narrowing of bounds via a
fno-chkp-narrow-bounds flag. Another non-intrusive
alternative is to mark objects that must not be narrowed
(e.g., flexible arrays) with a special compiler attribute.
Multithreading issues. Current Intel MPX implemen-
tations may introduce false positives and negatives in
multithreaded programs [16]. The problem arises because
of the way Intel MPX loads and stores pointer bounds
via its bndldx and bndstx instructions. Recall from §3
that whenever a pointer is loaded from main memory,
its bounds must also be loaded from the corresponding
bounds table (Figure 2b, Lines 8-9).
Ideally, the load of the pointer and its bounds must be
performed atomically (same for stores). However, nor
the current hardware implementation neither GCC/ICC
compilers enforce this atomicity. This lack of proper
multithreading support in Intel MPX can lead to (1) cor-
rect programs crashing due to false alarms, or (2) buggy
programs being exploited even if protected by Intel MPX.
Consider an example in Figure 8. A “pointer bounds”
data race happens on the arr array of pointers. The back-
ground thread fills this array with all pointers to the first
or to the second object alternately. Meanwhile, the main
thread accesses a whatever object is currently pointed-to
by the array items. Note that depending on the value
of the constant offset, the original program is either
always-correct or always-buggy: if offset is zero, then
the main thread always accesses the correct object, other-
wise it accesses an incorrect, adjacent object. The second
case, if found in a real code, introduces a vulnerability
which could be exploited by an adversary.
With Intel MPX, additional bndstx instruction is in-
serted in Line 2 to store the bound corresponding to the
first object (same for Line 3 and second object). Also,
a bndldx instruction is inserted in Line 5 to retrieve the
bound for an object referenced by arr[i]. Bound checks
bndcl and bndcu are also added at Line 5, before the
actual access to the object. Now, the following race can
occur. The main thread loads the pointer-to-first-object
from the array and—right before loading the correspond-
ing bound—is preempted by the background thread. The
background thread overwrites all array items such that
they point to the second object, and also overwrites the
corresponding bounds. Finally, the main thread is sched-
uled back and loads the bound, however, the bound now
corresponds to the second object. The main thread is left
with the pointer to the first object but with the bounds of
the second one.
We implemented this test case in C and compiled it
with both GCC and ICC. As expected, the MPX-enabled
program had both false positives and false negatives.
In case of a correct original program (i.e., with
offset=0), such discrepancy leads to a false positive
when actually accessing the object at Line 5. Indeed,
the pointer to the object is correct but the bounds were
overwritten by the background thread, so MPX triggers a
false-alarm exception. Debugging the root cause of such
non-deterministic pseudo-bugs would be a frustrating ex-
perience for end users.
The case of an originally buggy program (with
offset=1) is more disconcerting. After all, Intel MPX
is supposed to detect all out-of-bounds accesses, but in
this example Intel MPX introduces false negatives! Here,
the pointer to the first object plus offset incorrectly lends
into the second object. But since the main thread checks
against the bounds of the second object, this bug is not
caught by Intel MPX. We believe that this implemen-
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tation flaw—that out-of-bounds bugs can sometimes go
unnoticed—can scare off users of multithreaded applica-
tions. We also believe that a resourceful hacker would be
able to construct an exploit that, based on these findings,
could overcome Intel MPX defense with a high probabil-
ity [56].
We must note however that we did not observe incorrect
behavior in Phoenix and PARSEC multithreaded bench-
mark suites—we were lucky not to encounter programs
that break Intel MPX.
For safe use in multithreaded programs, MPX instru-
mentation must enforce atomicity of loading/storing point-
ers and their bounds. At the software (compiler) level,
this dictates the use of some synchronization primitive
around each pair of mov-bndldx/bndstx, being it fine-
grained locks, hardware transactional memory, or atomics.
Whatever primitive is chosen, we conjecture a significant
drop in performance of Intel MPX.
A solution at a microarchitectural level would be to
merge the pairs mov-bndldx/bndstx and assure their
atomic execution. The instruction decoder could detect
a bndldx, find the corresponding pointer mov in the in-
struction queue, and instruct the rest of execution to han-
dle these instructions atomically. However, we believe
this solution could require intrusive changes to the CPU
front-end. Moreover, it would significantly limit compiler
optimization capabilities.
4 Measurement Study
In this section we answer the following questions:
• What is the performance penalty of Intel MPX?
– How much slower does a program become?
– How does memory consumption change?
– How does protection affect scalability of multi-
threaded programs?
• What level of security does Intel MPX provide?
• What usability issues arise when Intel MPX is ap-
plied?
4.1 Experimental Setup
All the experimental infrastructure was build using Fex
[5] benchmarking framework with corresponding changes
for the required build types, measurement tools, and for
certain experimental procedures.
Testbed. All the experiments were performed on the
following setup:
1. Hardware:
• Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E3-1230 v5 @
3.40GHz
• 1 socket, 8 hyper-threads, 4 physical cores
• CPU caches: L1d = 32KB, L1i = 32KB,
L2 = 256KB, shared L3 = 8MB
• 64 GB of memory
2. Network. For experiments on case studies, we used
two machines with the network bandwidth between
them equal to 938 Mbits/sec as measured by iperf.
3. Software infrastructure:
• Kernel: 4.4.0
• GLibC: 2.21
• Binutils: 2.26.1
4. Compilers:
• GCC 6.1.0. Configured with:
−−enable−languages=c,c++ −−enable−libmpx
−−enable−multilib −−with−system−zlib
• ICC 17.0.0
• Clang/LLVM 3.8.0 (AddressSanitizer). Con-
figured with:
−G "Unix Makefiles"
−DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE="Release"
−DLLVM_TARGETS_TO_BUILD="X86"
• Clang/LLVM 3.2.0 (SAFECode). Configured
with:
−G "Unix Makefiles"
−DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE="Release"
−DLLVM_TARGETS_TO_BUILD="X86"
• Clang/LLVM 3.4.0 (SoftBound). Configured
with:
−−enable−optimized −−disable−bindings
Measurement tools. We used the following tools for
measurements:
• perf stat. Our main tool used to measure all CPU-
related parameters. The full list includes:
−e cycles,instructions,instructions:u,instructions:k
−e branch−instructions,branch−misses
−e dTLB−loads,dTLB−load−misses
−edTLB−stores,dTLB−store−misses
−e L1−dcache−loads,L1−dcache−load−misses
−e L1−dcache−stores,L1−dcache−store−misses
−e LLC−loads,LLC−load−misses
−e LLC−store−misses,LLC−stores
Not to introduce additional measurement error, we
measured these parameters in parts, 8 parameters at
a time.
• time. Since perf does not provide capabilities for
measuring physical memory consumption of a pro-
cess, we used time –verbose and collected maxi-
mum resident set size.
• Intel Pin. To gather Intel MPX instruction statistics,
we developed a Pin tool. Full code of our instrumen-
tation can be found in the repository.
Benchmarks. We used three benchmark suits in our eval-
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uation: PARSEC 3.0 [14], Phoenix 2.0 [45], and SPEC
CPU 2006 [26]. To remove some of the previously found
bugs, we applied a patch to SPEC suite. Also, during our
work, we found and fixed a set of bugs in them.
All the benchmarks were compiled together with the
libraries they depend upon (except raytrace from PARSEC
which requires X11 libraries).
Build types.
• GCC implementation of MPX.
– Compiler flags:
−fcheck−pointer−bounds −mmpx
– Linker flags:
−lmpx −lmpxwrappers
– Environment variables:
CHKP_RT_BNDPRESERVE="0"
CHKP_RT_MODE="stop"
CHKP_RT_VERBOSE="0"
CHKP_RT_PRINT_SUMMARY="0"
– Subtypes:
∗ Disabled bounds narrowing:
−fno−chkp−narrow−bounds
∗ Protecting only memory writes, not reads:
−fno−chkp−check−read
• ICC implementation of MPX.
– Compiler flags:
−check−pointers−mpx=rw
– Linker flags:
−lmpx
– Environment variables:
CHKP_RT_BNDPRESERVE="0"
CHKP_RT_MODE="stop"
CHKP_RT_VERBOSE="0"
CHKP_RT_PRINT_SUMMARY="0"
– Subtypes:
∗ Disabled bounds narrowing:
−no−check−pointers−narrowing
∗ protecting only memory writes, not reads:
−check−pointers−mpx=write
// instead of
−check−pointers−mpx=rw
• AddressSanitizer (both GCC and Clang).
– Compiler flags:
−fsanitize=address
– Environment variables:
ASAN_OPTIONS="verbosity=0:\
detect_leaks=false:\
print_summary=true:\
halt_on_error=true:\
poison_heap=true:\
alloc_dealloc_mismatch=0:\
new_delete_type_mismatch=0"
Experiment Average CV, % Maximum CV, %
Phoenix 0.34 3.87
PARSEC 0.28 3.75
SPEC 0.41 3.96
All 0.35 3.96
Table 5: Variation of results in our experiments.
– Subtypes:
∗ Protecting only memory writes, not reads:
−−param asan−instrument−reads=0
• SoftBound.
– Compiler flags:
−fsoftboundcets −flto −fno−vectorize
– Linker flags:
−lm −lrt
• SAFECode.
– Compiler flags:
−fmemsafety −g
−fmemsafety−terminate −stack−protector=1
Experiments. Each program was executed 10 times, and
the results were averaged using arithmetic mean (note, we
made sure that variance is very low and it is safe to use
arithmetic mean). The mean across different programs
in the benchmark suite was calculated using geometric
mean. Geometric mean was also used to calculate the
“final” mean across three benchmark suites.
We performed the following types of experiments:
• normal: experiments on a single thread (serialized)
and with fixed input
• multithreaded: experiments on 2, 4, and 8 threads
• variable inputs: experiments with increasing input
size (5 runs, each next one with an input twice bigger
than the previous)
The results were checked to fulfill the following crite-
ria:
• application compiled successfully
• application run successfully (with zero exit code)
• the output is equal to the output of non-protected
application (if it is deterministic)
Values of coefficient of variation (CV) are presented in
Table 5.
4.2 Performance
To evaluate overheads incurred by Intel MPX, we tested
it on three benchmark suites: Phoenix 2.0 [45], PARSEC
3.0 [14], and SPEC CPU2006 [26]. To put the results
into context, we measured not only the ICC and GCC
implementations of Intel MPX, but also AddressSanitizer,
SAFECode, and SoftBound (see §2 for details).
Runtime overhead. We start with the single most impor-
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tant parameter: runtime overhead (see Figure 9).
First, we note that ICC-MPX performs significantly
better than GCC-MPX. At the same time, ICC is less
usable: only 30 programs out of total 38 (79%) build and
run correctly, whereas 33 programs out of 38 (87%) work
under GCC (see also §4.4).
AddressSanitizer, despite being a software-only ap-
proach, performs on par with ICC-MPX and better than
GCC-MPX. This unexpected result testifies that the
hardware-assisted performance improvements of Intel
MPX are offset by its complicated design and suboptimal
instructions. Although, AddressSanitizer provides worse
security guarantees than Intel MPX (§4.3).
SAFECode and SoftBound show good results on
Phoenix programs, but behave much worse—both in
terms of performance and usability—on PARSEC and
SPEC. First, consider SAFECode on Phoenix: due to
the almost-pointerless design and simplicity of Phoenix
programs, SAFECode achieves a low overhead of 5%.
However, it could run only 18 programs out of 31 (58%)
on PARSEC and SPEC and exhibited the highest overall
overheads. SoftBound executed only 7 programs on PAR-
SEC and SPEC (23%). Moreover, both SAFECode and
SoftBound showed unstable behavior: some programs
had overheads of more than 20× .
Instruction overhead. In most cases, performance over-
heads are dominated by a single factor: the increase in
number of instructions executed in a protected application.
It can be seen if we compare Figures 9 and 10; there is a
strong correlation between them.
As expected, the optimized MPX (i.e., ICC version)
has low instruction overhead due to its HW assistance
(~70% lower than AddressSanitizer). Thus, one could
expect sufficiently low performance overheads of Intel
MPX once the throughput and latencies of Intel MPX
instructions improve (see §3.1).
Instruction overhead of Intel MPX may also come from
the management of Bounds Tables (see §3.2). Our mi-
crobenchmarks show that it can cause a slowdown of more
than 100% in the worst case. However, we did not ob-
serve a noticeable impact in real-world applications. Even
those applications that create hundreds of BTs exhibit a
minor slowdown in comparison to other factors.
IPC. Many programs do not utilize the CPU execution-
unit resources fully. For example, the theoretical IPC
(instructions/cycle) of our machine is ~5, but many pro-
grams achieve only 1–2 IPC in native executions (see
Figure 11). Thus, memory-safety techniques benefit from
underutilized CPU and partially mask their performance
overhead.
The most important observation here is that Intel MPX
does not increase IPC. Our microbenchmarks (§3.1) in-
dicate that this is caused by contention of MPX bounds-
checking instructions on one execution port. If this func-
tionality would be available on more ports, Intel MPX
would be able to use instruction parallelism to a higher
extent and the overheads would be lower.
At the same time, software-only approaches—
especially AddressSanitizer and SoftBound—
significantly increase IPC, partially hiding their
performance overheads.
Cache utilization. Some programs are memory-intensive
and stress the CPU cache system. If a native program has
many L1 or LLC cache misses, then the memory sub-
system becomes the bottleneck. In these cases, memory-
safety techniques can partially hide their performance
overhead.
It can be illustrated with the wordcnt example compiled
with ICC-MPX (Figure 12). It has a huge instruction
overhead of 4×, IPC close to native, and (as we will see
next) many expensive bndldx and bndstx operations.
And still its performance overhead is only 3×. Why? It
appears the native version of wordcnt has a significant
number of cache misses. They have high performance
cost and therefore can partially mask the overhead of
ICC-MPX.
Intel MPX instructions. In the case of Intel MPX, one
of the most important performance factors is the type of
instructions that are used in instrumentation. In particular,
storing (bndstx) and loading (bndldx) bounds require
two-level address translation—a very expensive operation
that can break cache locality (see §3.1). To prove it,
we measured the shares of MPX instructions in the total
number of instructions of each program (Figure 13).
As expected, a lion share of all MPX instructions are
bounds-checking bndcl and bndcu. Additionally, many
programs need bndmov to move bounds from one reg-
ister to another (bndmovreg) or spill bounds on stack
(bndmovmem). Finally, pointer-intensive programs require
the use of expensive bndstx and bndldx to store/load
bounds in Bounds Tables.
There is a strong correlation between the share of
bndstx and bndldx instructions and performance over-
heads. For example, matrixmul under ICC-MPX almost
exclusively contains bounds checks: accordingly, there
is a direct mapping between instruction and performance
overheads. However, the GCC-MPX version is less opti-
mized and inserts many bndldxs, which leads to a signif-
icantly higher performance overhead.
The ICC-MPX version of wordcnt has a ridiculous
share of bndldx/bndstx instructions. This is due to a
performance bug in libchkp library of ICC that uses a
naive algorithm for the memcpy wrapper (see §3.3).
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Figure 12: CPU cache behavior of native and protected versions.
Memory consumption. In some scenarios, memory over-
heads (more specifically, resident set size overheads)
can be a limiting factor, e.g., for servers in data centers
which co-locate programs and perform frequent migra-
tions. Thus, Figure 14 shows memory overhead measure-
ments.
On average, Intel MPX has a 2.1× memory overhead
under ICC version and 1.9× under GCC. It is a signifi-
cant improvement over AddressSanitizer (2.8×). There
are three main reasons for that. First, AddressSanitizer
changes memory layout of allocated objects by adding
“redzones” around each object. Second, it maintains a
“shadow zone” that is directly mapped to main memory
and grows linearly with the program’s working set size.
Third, AddressSanitizer has a “quarantine” feature that
restricts the reuse of freed memory 7. On the contrary,
7Quarantine is a temporal-protection feature and, in principle, it
gives an unfair advantage to Intel MPX which lacks this kind of protec-
tion. Indeed, if quarantine zone is disabled, AddressSanitizer’s memory
Intel MPX allocates space only for pointer-bounds meta-
data and has an intermediary Bounds Directory that trades
lower memory consumption for longer access time. In-
terestingly, SAFECode exhibits even lower memory over-
heads because of its pool-allocation technique. Unfortu-
nately, low memory consumption does not imply good
performance.
Influence of additional Intel MPX features. Intel MPX
has two main features that influence both performance and
security guaranties (§3.3). Bounds narrowing increases
security level but may harm performance. Only-write
protection, on the other side, improves performance by
disabling checks on memory reads.
The comparison of these features is presented in Fig-
overhead drops on average to ~1.5× for both PARSEC and SPEC, al-
though the performance overhead is not influenced. We did not include
this number into our main results because the goad of our study was to
compare the solutions in their default configuration, without any tweaks
from the side of end user.
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Figure 14: Memory overhead with respect to native version. (Lower is better.)
ures 15 and 16. As we can see, bounds narrowing has a
low impact on performance because it does not change
the number of checks. At the same time, it may slightly in-
crease memory consumption because it has to keep more
bounds. Only-write checking has the opposite effect—
having to instrument less code reduces the slowdown but
barely has any impact on memory consumption.
Multithreading. To evaluate the influence of multithread-
ing, we measured execution times of all benchmarks on
2 and 8 threads (see Figure 17). Note that only Phoenix
and PARSEC are multithreaded (SPEC is not). Also,
both SoftBound and SAFECode are not thread-safe and
therefore were excluded from measurements.
As we can see from Figure 17, the difference in scalabil-
ity is minimal. For Intel MPX, it is caused by the absence
of multithreading support, which means that no additional
code is executed in multithreaded versions. For Address-
Sanitizer, there is no need for explicit synchronization—
the approach is thread-safe by design.
Peculiarly, GCC-MPX experiences not speedups but
slowdowns on linearreg and wordcnt. Upon examining
these cases, we found out that this anomaly is due to
detrimental cache line sharing of BT entries.
For swaptions, AddressSanitizer and Intel MPX scale
significantly worse than native. It turns out that these
techniques do not have enough spare IPC resources to
fully utilize 8 threads in comparison to the native version
(the problem of hyperthreading). Similarly, for stream-
cluster, Intel MPX performs worse than AddressSanitizer
and native versions. This is again an issue with hyper-
threading: Intel MPX instructions saturate IPC resources
on 8 threads and thus cannot scale as good as native.
Varying inputs sizes. Different input sizes (working sets)
may cause different cache behaviors, which in turn causes
changes in overheads. To investigate the extent of such
effects, we ran several benchmarks with three inputs—
small, medium, and large. The results do not provide any
unexpected insights and thus omitted from the paper (but
can be found on the website). The general trend is that the
input size has very little impact on performance overhead.
4.3 Security
RIPE testbed. We evaluated all approaches against the
RIPE security testbed [53]. RIPE is a synthesized C pro-
gram that tries to attack itself in a number of ways, by
overflowing a buffer allocated on the stack, heap, or in
data or BSS segments. RIPE can imitate up to 850 attacks,
including shellcode, return-into-libc, and return-oriented
programming. In our evaluation, even under relaxed se-
curity flags—we disabled Linux ASLR, stack canaries,
and fortify-source and enabled executable stack—modern
compilers were susceptible only to a small number of at-
tacks. Under native GCC, only 64 attacks survived, under
ICC—34, and under Clang—38.8
The results for all approaches are presented in Table 6.
Surprisingly, a default GCC-MPX version showed very
poor results, with 41 attacks (or 64% of all possible at-
tacks) succeeding. As it turned out, the default GCC-MPX
flags are sub-optimal. First, we found a bug in the memcpy
wrapper which forced bounds registers to be nullified, so
the bounds checks on memcpy were rendered useless (see
Table 3). This bug disappears if the BNDPRESERVE envi-
ronment variable is manually set to one. Second, the MPX
pass in GCC does not narrow bounds for the first field
of a struct by default, in contrast to ICC which is more
strict. To catch intra-object overflows happening in the
8RIPE is specifically tailored to GCC, thus more attacks are possible
under this compiler.
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Approach Working attacks
MPX (GCC) default * 41/64 (all memcpy and intra-object of.)
MPX (GCC) 0/64 (none)
MPX (GCC) no narrow 14/64 (all intra-object overflows)
MPX (ICC) 0/34 (none)
MPX (ICC) no narrow 14/34 (all intra-object overflows)
AddressSanitizer (GCC) 12/64 (all intra-object overflows)
SoftBound (Clang) 14/38 (all intra-object overflows)
SAFECode (Clang) 14/38 (all intra-object overflows)
*Without -fchkp-first-field-has-own-bounds
and with BNDPRESERVE=0
Table 6: Results of RIPE security benchmark. In Col.
2, “41/64” means that 64 attacks were successful in
native GCC version, and 41 attacks remained in MPX
version.
first field of structs–the case of RIPE code—one needs to
pass the -fchkp-first-field-has-own-bounds flag
to GCC. When we enabled these two flags, all attacks
were prevented; all next rows in the table were tested with
these flags.
Other results are expected. Intel MPX versions without
narrowing of bounds overlook 14 intra-object overflow
attacks, where a vulnerable buffer and a victim object live
in the same struct. The same attacks are overlooked by
AddressSanitizer, SoftBound, and SAFECode. Interest-
ingly, AddressSanitizer has 12 working attacks, i.e., two
attacks less than other approaches. Though we did not
inspect this in detail, AddressSanitizer was able to prevent
two shellcode intra-object attacks on the heap.
We performed the same experiment with only-writes
versions of these approaches, and the results were ex-
actly the same. This is explained by the fact that RIPE
constructs only control-flow hijacking attacks and not
information leaks (which could escape only-writes pro-
tection).
Other detected bugs. During our experiments, we found
6 real out-of-bounds bugs (true positives). Five of these
bugs were already known, and one was detected by GCC-
MPX and was not previously reported.
The bugs found are: (1) incorrect black-and-white in-
put pictures leading to classic buffer overflow in ferret,
(2) wrong preincrement statement leading to classic
off-by-one bug in h264ref, (3) out-of-bounds write in
perlbench, (4) benign intra-object buffer overwrite in
x264, (5) benign intra-object buffer overread in h264ref,
and (6) intra-object buffer overwrite in perlbench.
All of these bugs were detected by GCC-MPX with
narrowing of bounds. Predictably, three intra-object bugs
and one read-only bug could not be detected by the no-
narrowing and only-writes versions of Intel MPX respec-
tively. ICC-MPX detected only three bugs in total: in
other cases programs failed due to MPX-related issues
(see §3.3 and §3.4). An interesting correlation emerged:
the programs that contain real bugs are also the ones that
break most often under Intel MPX.
As expected, AddressSanitizer found only three of
these bugs—it checks bounds at the level of whole ob-
jects and cannot detect intra-object overflows. SAFE-
Code found bugs (2) and (3), the others either could not
be detected due to coarse-grained granularity of bounds-
checking or SAFECode could not compile the programs.
Unfortunately, SoftBound left bug (2) undetected and
broke on other three programs with bugs: ferret and
x264 are multithreaded and thus not supported by Soft-
Bound, and perlbench would not run correctly.
4.4 Usability
As we showed in §3.4, some programs break under Intel
MPX because they use unsupported C idioms or outright
violate the C standard. Moreover, as shown in §3.3, other
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Figure 18: Number of MPX-broken programs rises
with stricter Intel MPX protection rules (higher security
levels). Level 4 is default.
programs even fail to compile or run due to internal bugs
in the compiler MPX passes (one case for GCC and 8 for
ICC).
Figure 18 highlights the usability of Intel MPX, i.e., the
number of MPX-protected programs that fail to compile
correctly and/or need significant code modifications. Note
that many programs can be easily fixed (see Table 4); we
do not count them as broken. MPX security levels are
based on our own classification and correspond to the
stricter protection rules, where level 0 means unprotected
native version and 6—the most secure MPX configuration
(see §6). In total, our evaluation covers 38 programs from
the Phoenix, PARSEC, and SPEC benchmark suites.
As can be seen, around 10% of programs break already
at the weakest level 1 of Intel MPX protection (without
narrowing of bounds and protecting only writes). At
the highest security level 6 (with enabled BNDPRESERVE),
most of the programs fail.
As for other approaches, no programs broke under Ad-
dressSanitizer. For SAFECode, around 70% programs ex-
ecuted correctly (all Phoenix, half of PARSEC, and 3/4 of
SPEC). SoftBound—being a prototype implementation–
showed poor results, with only simple programs surviving
(all Phoenix, one PARSEC, and 6 SPEC). These results
roughly correspond to the ones in the original papers
[18, 38].
Encountered issues. Figure 19 presents an overview of
the issues we encountered during our experiments.
AddressSanitizer has no usability issues—by design
it makes no assumptions on the C standard with respect
to the memory model. Also, it is the most stable tested
product, fixed and updated with each new version of GCC
and Clang.
On the contrary, SoftBound and SAFECode are re-
search prototypes. They work perfectly with very simple
programs from Phoenix, but are not able to compile/run
correctly the more complicated benchmarks from PAR-
SEC and SPEC. Moreover, SoftBound does not support
multithreading, and any multithreaded program immedi-
ately fails under it.
Both GCC-MPX and ICC-MPX break most programs
on Level 6 (with BNDPRESERVE=1). This is because
BNDPRESERVE does not clear bounds on pointers trans-
ferred from/to unprotected legacy libraries. This means
that any pointer returned from or modified by any legacy
library (including C standard library) will almost certainly
contain wrong bounds. Because of this, 89% of GCC-
MPX and 76% of ICC-MPX programs break. These cases
are represented as gray boxes.
Note that for Phoenix, GCC-MPX fails in most cases
while ICC-MPX works correctly. This is because of a
slight difference in libc wrappers: all the failing programs
use mmap64 function which is correctly wrapped by ICC-
MPX but ignored by GCC-MPX. Thus, in the GCC case,
the newly allocated pointer contains no bounds which
(under BNDPRESERVE=1) is treated as an out-of-bounds
violation.
One can wonder why some programs still work even
if interoperability with C standard library is broken. The
reason is that programs like kmeans, pca, and lbm require
literally no external functions except malloc, memset, free,
etc.—which are provided by the wrapper MPX libraries.
Some programs break due to memory model violation:
• ferret and raytrace both have structs with the
first field used to access other fields in the
struct (a common practice that is actually dis-
allowed by the C standard). ICC-MPX dis-
allows this behavior when bounds narrowing
is enabled. GCC-MPX allows such behavior
by default and has a special switch to tighten
it (-fno-chkp-first-field-has-own-bounds)
which we classify as Level 5.
• gcc has its own complex memory model with bit-
twiddling, type-casting, and other practices depre-
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Figure 19: All changes made to the programs under test as well as reasons why some programs break at compile- or
run-time.
cated by the C standard.
• soplex manually modifies pointers-to-object from
one address to another using pointer arithmetic, with-
out any respect towards pointer bounds. By design,
Intel MPX cannot circumvent this violation of the C
standard. (The same happens in mcf but only in one
corner-case on test input.)
• xalancbmk performs a container-style subtraction
from the base of a struct. This leads to GCC-MPX
and ICC-MPX breaking when bounds narrowing is
enabled.
• We also manually fixed some memory-model vio-
lations, e.g., flexible arrays with size 1 (arr[1]).
These fixes are represented as yellow background.
In some cases, real bugs were detected (see also §4.3):
• Three bugs in ferret, h264ref, and perlbench were
detected and fixed by us. These fixes are represented
as blue background.
• Three bugs in x264, h264ref, and perlbench were
detected only by GCC-MPX versions. These bugs
are represented as red boxes. Note that ICC-MPX
missed bugs in h264ref and perlbench. Upon debug-
ging, we noticed that ICC-MPX narrowed bounds
less strictly than GCC-MPX and thus missed the
bugs. We were not able to hunt out the root cause,
but presume it is due to different memory layouts
generated by GCC and ICC compilers.
In rare cases, we hit compiler bugs in GCC and ICC:
• GCC-MPX had only one bug, an obscure “fatal in-
ternal GCC compiler error” on only-write versions
of xalancbmk.
• ICC-MPX has an autovectorization bug triggered on
some versions of vips, gobmk, h264ref, and milc.
• ICC-MPX has a “wrong-bounds through indirect
call” bug triggered on some versions of x264 and
xalancbmk.
• ICC-MPX has a bug we could not identify triggered
on dealII.
• We also manually fixed all manifestations of the C99
VLA bug in ICC-MPX. These bugs are represented
as pink background.
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5 Case Studies
To understand how Intel MPX affects complex real-world
applications, we experimented with three case studies:
Apache and Nginx web servers and Memcached mem-
ory caching system. Similar to the previous section, we
evaluated these programs along three dimensions: perfor-
mance and memory overheads, security guarantees, and
usability.
We compare default Intel MPX implementations of
both GCC and ICC against the native version, as well
as AddressSanitizer. We were not able to compile any
of the case studies under SoftBound and SAFECode: in
most cases, the Configure scripts complained about an
“unsupported compiler”, and in one case (Apache under
SoftBound) the compilation crashed due to an internal
compiler error. The native version we chose to show is
GCC: native ICC and Clang versions have almost iden-
tical results, with an exception of Nginx explained later.
For the same reasons, we show only the GCC implemen-
tation of AddressSanitizer.
All experiments were performed on the same machines
as in the previous section (§4). One machine served as a
server and a second one as clients, connected with a 1GB
Ethernet cable and an actual bandwidth of 938 Mbits/sec.
We configured all case studies to utilize all 8 cores of the
server (details below). For other configuration parameters,
we kept their default values.
All three programs were linked against their dependent
libraries statically. We opted for static linking to investi-
gate the complete overhead of all components constituting
each program.
5.1 Apache Web Server
For evaluation, we used Apache version 2.4.18 linked
against OpenSSL 1.0.1f [4]. This OpenSSL version is
vulnerable to the infamous Heartbleed bug which allows
the attacker to leak confidential information such as secret
keys and user passwords in plain-text [11]. Since both
AddressSanitizer and Intel MPX do not support inline
assembly, we disabled it for all builds of Apache. To fully
utilize the server, we used the default configuration of
Apache’s MPM event model.
The classic ab benchmark was run on a client machine
to generate workload, constantly fetching a static 2.3K
web-page via HTTP, with a KeepAlive feature enabled. To
adapt the load, we increased the number of simultaneous
requests at a time.
Unfortunately, while testing against Heartbleed, we
discovered that ICC-MPX suffers from a run-time Intel
Apache Nginx Memcached
Native 9.4 4.3 73
MPX 120 18 352
ASan 33 380 95
Table 7: Memory usage (MB) for peak throughput.
(GCC-MPX and ICC-MPX showed identical results.)
compiler bug9 in the x509_cb OpenSSL function, leading
to a crash of Apache. This bug triggered only on HTTPS
connections, thus allowing us to still run performance
experiments on ICC-MPX.
Performance. As Figure 20a shows, GCC-MPX, ICC-
MPX, and AddressSanitizer all show minimal overheads,
achieving 95.3%, 95.7%, and 97.5% of native throughput.
Overhead in latency did not exceed 5%. Such good per-
formance is explained by the fact that our experiment was
limited by the network and not CPU or memory. (We ob-
served around 480−520% CPU utilization in all cases.)
In terms of memory usage (Table 7), AddressSanitizer
exhibits an expected 3.5× overhead. In contrast, Intel
MPX variants have dramatic 12.8× increase in memory
consumption. This is explained by the fact that Apache
allocates an additional 1MB of pointer-heavy data per
each client, which in turn leads to the allocation of many
Bounds Tables.
Security. For security evaluation, we exploited the infa-
mous Heartbleed bug [3, 11]. In a nutshell, Heartbleed
is triggered when a maliciously crafted TLS heartbeat
message is received by the server. The server does not
sanity-check the length-of-payload parameter in the mes-
sage header, thus allowing memcpy to copy the process
memory’s contents in the reply message. In this way, the
attacker can read confidential memory contents.
AddressSanitizer and GCC-MPX detect Heartbleed10.
5.2 Nginx Web Server
We tested Nginx version 1.4.0—the last version with a
stack buffer overflow vulnerability [10]. Nginx was con-
figured with the “autodetected” number of worker pro-
cesses to load all cores and was benchmarked against the
same ab benchmark as Apache. ab was also used as a
client.
To successfully run Nginx under GCC-MPX with nar-
rowing of bounds, we had to manually fix a variable-
9https://software.intel.com/en-us/forums/intel-c-
compiler/topic/700550
10The actual situation with Heartbleed is more contrived. OpenSSL
uses its own memory manager which partially bypasses the wrappers
around malloc and mmap. Thus, in reality memory-safety approaches
find Heartbleed only if the length parameter is greater than 32KB (the
granularity at which OpenSSL allocates chunks of memory for its inter-
nal allocator) [6].
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Figure 20: Throughput-latency for (a) Apache web server, (b) Nginx web server, and (c) Memcached caching system.
length array name[1] in the ngx_hash_elt_t struct to
name[0]. However, ICC-MPX with narrowing of bounds
still refused to run correctly, crashing with a false positive
in ngx_http_merge_locations function. In a nutshell,
the reason for this bug was a cast from a smaller type,
which rendered the bounds too narrow for the new, larger
type. Note that GCC-MPX did not experience the same
problem because it enforces the first struct’s field to inherit
the bounds of the whole object by default—in contrast to
ICC-MPX which takes a more rigorous stance. For the
following evaluation, we used the version of ICC-MPX
with narrowing of bounds disabled.
Performance. With regards to performance (Figure 20b),
Nginx has a similar behavior to Apache. AddressSani-
tizer reaches 95% of native throughput, while GCC-MPX
and ICC-MPX lag behind with 86% and 89.5% respec-
tively. Similar to Apache, this experiment was network-
bound, with CPU usage of 225% for native, 265% for
Intel MPX, and 300% for AddressSanitizer. (CPU usage
numbers prove that HW-assisted approaches impose less
CPU overheads.)
As a side note, Nginx has predictable behavior only
under GCC. Native ICC version reaches only 85% of the
GCC’s throughput, and native Clang only 90%. Even
more surprising, the ICC-MPX version performed 5%
better than native ICC; similarly, the AddressSanitizer-
Clang version was 10% better than native Clang. We are
still investigating the reasons for this unexpected behavior.
As for memory consumption (Table 7), the situation
is opposite as with Apache: Intel MPX variants have a
reasonable 4.2× memory overhead, but AddressSanitizer
eats up 88× more memory (it also has 625× more page
faults and 13% more LLC cache misses). But then why
Intel MPX is slower than AddressSanitizer if their mem-
ory characteristics indicate otherwise? The reason for
the horrifying AddressSanitizer numbers is its “quaran-
tine” feature—AddressSanitizer employs a special mem-
ory management system which avoids re-allocating the
same memory region for new objects, thus decreasing
the probability of temporal bugs such as use-after-free.
Instead, AddressSanitizer marks the used memory as “poi-
soned” and requests new memory chunks from the OS
(this explains huge number of page faults). Since native
Nginx recycles the same memory over and over again
for the incoming requests, AddressSanitizer experiences
huge memory blow-up. When we disabled the quarantine
feature, AddressSanitizer used only 24MB of memory.
Note that this quarantine problem does not affect perfor-
mance. Firstly, Nginx is network-bound and has enough
spare resources to hide this issue. Secondly, the rather
large overhead of allocating new memory hides the over-
head of requesting new chunks from the OS.
Security. To evaluate security, the bug under test was a
stack buffer overflow CVE-2013-2028 that can be used
to launch a ROP attack [2]. Here, a maliciously crafted
HTTP request forces Nginx to erroneously recognize a
signed integer as unsigned. Later, a recv function is
called with the overflown size argument and the bug is
triggered.
Perhaps surprisingly, AddressSanitizer detects this bug,
but both versions of Intel MPX do not. The root cause is
the run-time wrapper library: AddressSanitizer wraps all
C library functions including recv, and the wrapper—not
the Nginx instrumented code—detects the overflow. In
case of both GCC-MPX and ICC-MPX, only the most
widely used functions, such as memcpy and strlen, are
wrapped and bounds-checked. That is why when recv is
called, the overflow happens in the unprotected C library
function and goes undetected by Intel MPX.
This highlights the importance of full protection—not
only protecting the program’s own code, but also writing
wrappers around all unprotected libraries used by the pro-
gram. Another interesting aspect is that this overflow bug
is read-only and cannot be caught by write-only protec-
tion. No matter how tempting it may sound to protect only
writes, one must remember that buffer-overread vulner-
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abilities will slip away from such low-overhead bounds
checking.
5.3 Memcached Caching System
Lastly, we experimented with Memcached version 1.4.15
[22]. This is the last version susceptible to a simple DDoS
attack [9]. In all experiments, Memcached was run with
8 threads to fully utilize the server. For the client we
used a memaslap benchmark from libmemcached with a
default configuration (90% reads of average size 1700B,
10% writes of average size 400B). We increased the load
by adapting the concurrency number.
After some vexing debugging experiences with Nginx
and Apache, we were pleased to experience no issues in-
strumenting Memcached with GCC-MPX and ICC-MPX.
Performance. Performance-wise, Memcached turned
out to be the worst case for Intel MPX (see Figure 20c).
While AddressSanitizer performs on par with the native
version, both GCC-MPX and ICC-MPX achieved only
48−50% of maximum native throughput.
In case of native and AddressSanitizer, performance
of Memcached was limited by network. But it was not
the case for Intel MPX: Memcached exercised only 70%
of the network bandwidth. The memory usage numbers
in Table 7 help understand the bottleneck of Intel MPX.
While AddressSanitizer imposed only 30% memory over-
head, both Intel MPX variants used 350MB of memory
(4.8× more than native). This huge memory overhead
broke cache locality and resulted in 5.4×more page faults
and 10−15% LLC misses, making Intel MPX versions
essentially memory-bound. (Indeed, the CPU utilization
never exceeded 320%.)
Security. For security evaluation, we used a CVE-2011-
4971 vulnerability [9]. In this denial-of-service attack,
a specially crafted packet is received by the server and
passed to the handler (conn_nread) which tries to copy
all packet’s contents into another buffer via the memmove
function. However, due to the integer signedness er-
ror in the size argument, memmove tries to copy giga-
bytes of data and quickly segfaults. All approaches—
AddressSanitizer, GCC-MPX, and ICC-MPX—detected
buffer overflow in the affected function’s arguments and
stopped the execution.
6 Lessons Learned
Table 8 summarizes the results of our work. For con-
venience, we introduce six Intel MPX security levels to
highlight the trade-offs between security, usability, and
performance.
In general, Intel MPX is a promising technology: it pro-
vides the strongest possible security guarantees against
spatial errors, it instruments most programs transparently
and correctly, its ICC incarnation has moderate overheads
of ~50%, it can interoperate with unprotected legacy li-
braries, and its protection level is easily configurable.
However, our evaluation indicates that it is not yet ready
for widespread use because of the following issues:
Lesson 1: New instructions are not as fast as expected.
First, current Skylake processors perform bounds check-
ing mostly sequentially. Our microbenchmarks indicate
this is caused by contention of bounds-checking instruc-
tions on one execution port.11 Secondly, loading/storing
bounds registers from/to memory involves costly two-
level address translation, which can contribute a signif-
icant share to the overhead. Together, these two issues
lead to tangible runtime overheads of ~50% even with all
optimizations applied (in the ICC case).
Lesson 2: The supporting infrastructure is not ma-
ture enough. Intel MPX support is available for GCC
and ICC compilers. At the compiler level, GCC-MPX has
severe performance issues (~150%) whereas ICC-MPX
has a number of compiler bugs (such that 10% of pro-
grams broke in our evaluation). At the runtime-support
level, both GCC and ICC provide only a small subset
of function wrappers for the C standard library, thus not
detecting bugs in many libc functions.
Lesson 3: Intel MPX provides no temporal protection.
Currently, Intel MPX protects only against spatial (out-
of-bounds accesses) but not temporal (dangling pointers)
errors. All other tested approaches—AddressSanitizer,
SoftBound, and SAFECode—guarantee some form of
temporal safety. We believe Intel MPX can be enhanced
for temporal safety without harming performance, similar
to SoftBound.
Lesson 4: Intel MPX does not support multithreading.
An MPX-protected multithreaded program can have both
false positives (false alarms) and false negatives (missed
bugs and undetected attacks). Until this issue is fixed—
either at the software or at the hardware level—Intel MPX
cannot be considered safe in multithreaded environments.
Unfortunately, we do not see a simple fix to this problem
that would not affect performance adversely.
Lesson 5: Intel MPX is not compatible with some C
idioms. Intel MPX imposes restrictions on allowed mem-
ory layout which conflict with several widespread C pro-
gramming practices, such as intra-structure memory ac-
cesses and custom implementation of memory manage-
ment. This can result in unexpected program crashes and
11We project that, if this functionality would be available on more
ports, Intel MPX would be able to use instruction parallelism to a higher
extent and the overheads would be lower.
21
RIPE attacks Unfound bugs Broken Perf (×)
Level Description Detects GCC ICC GCC ICC GCC ICC GCC ICC
0 native program (no protection) — 64 34 6 3 0 0 1.00 1.00
1 MPX only-writes and no narrowing of bounds inter-object overwrites 14 14 3 0 3 5 1.29 1.18
2 MPX no narrowing of bounds + inter-object overreads 14 14 3 0 2 8 2.39 1.46
3 MPX only-writes and narrowing of bounds all overwrites* 14 0 2 0 4 7 1.30 1.19
4 MPX narrowing of bounds (default) + all overreads* 14 0 0 0 4 9 2.52 1.47
5 + fchkp-first-field-has-own-bounds* + all overreads 0 – 0 – 6 – 2.52 –
6 + BNDPRESERVE=1 (protect all code) all overflows 0 0 0 0 34 29 – –
AddressSanitizer [47] inter-object overflows 12 – 3 – 0 – 1.55 –
* except intra-object overflows through the first field of struct, level 5 removes this limitation (only relevant for GCC version)
Table 8: The summary table with our classification of Intel MPX security levels—from lowest L1 to highest
L6—highlights the trade-off between security (number of unprevented RIPE attacks and other Unfound bugs in
benchmarks), usability (number of MPX-Broken programs), and performance overhead (average Perf overhead w.r.t.
native executions). AddressSanitizer is shown for comparison in the last row.
is hard to fix; we were not able to run correctly 8–13%
programs (this would require substantial code changes).
In conclusion, we believe that Intel MPX has a poten-
tial for becoming the memory protection tool of choice,
but currently, AddressSanitizer is the only production-
ready option. Even though it provides weaker security
guarantees than the other techniques, its current imple-
mentation is better in terms of performance and usability.
SoftBound and SAFECode are research prototypes and
they have issues that restrict their usage in real-world ap-
plications (although SoftBound provides higher level of
security).
We expect that most identified issues with Intel MPX
will be fixed in future versions. Still, support for multi-
threading and restrictions on memory layout are inherent
design limitations of Intel MPX which would require
sophisticated solutions, which would in turn negatively
affect performance. We hope our work will help practi-
tioners to better understand the benefits and caveats of
Intel MPX, and researchers—to concentrate their efforts
on those issues still waiting to be solved.
All sources of our experiments can be found in the
public repository.
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